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Abstract 
Game Information System (IS) consoles are used by millions of players at any one time to access the Internet and 
information resources. In this research we questioned the security of these systems and evaluated one identified 
vulnerability for the impacts on eBusiness IS. A number of systematic attacks were made in a controlled laboratory 
environment on a game system to evaluate the security. In general the system was robust and repelled the attacks. 
However one vulnerability was discovered and exploited to demonstrate how an Xbox or consoles with similar 
weaknesses can be used to access eBusiness web sites using false credentials. The demonstration emphasises the 
range of vectors and sources of vulnerability that may come to bear on an eBusiness IS on account of new and 
evolving IS applications.  The paper demonstrates one vulnerability and the potential for exploitation. The steps 
to defend against such problems are outlined and suggestions made to improve current game console security. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The stories surrounding the exploitation of game consoles and massive online gaming frauds have accelerated 
attempts to look for weaknesses in the scenarios of online gaming. In our research we found game consoles to be 
robust and resilient against many attacks but not all. There are a number of vulnerabilities that may be exploited 
but in general strong attempts have been made to protect game consoles from exploitation or illegal use (Langshaw, 
2011). The motivation appears to be the protection of copyright and proprietary use rather than specific protection 
from a range of malicious exploits. The apparent motivation is understandable given the huge revenue market 
created by the consoles and the competition between the brands to differentiate in the market place. Game consoles 
have Internet connectivity and manage large quantities of data including personal identity data and data of 
monetary value. Most consoles provide opportunity to purchase product such as merchandise and software online. 
The content distribution method known as digital distribution is used where digital goods and services are offered 
to the consumer via various forms of digital storefront. The consequence is that the exchange of passwords, credit 
card details, and other valuables are regularly transacted. Such rich data can be attractive to both legitimate and 
illegitimate use and it can be expected illegal activities may also be prevalent (Xbox Live, 2012). In many respects 
game consoles are the new eBusiness platform that is sweeping the world (Tondel, Line, Jaatum, 2014). 
In our research we attempted three attacks in a controlled laboratory condition on a console to assess risks 
associated with the console. These attacks were selected from the literature as being feasible within the proposed 
controlled environment. First we attempted to disrupt live game play, take play artefacts and to change login 
credentials. Secondly we looked at disrupting the game applications themselves and thirdly attempted spoofing 
session identities. Not surprisingly the heavy security prevented disruption to live game play. Also removing 
artefacts from play and changing login credentials for one player impersonating another were quickly shut down 
or prevented. Such security would be expected so that the integrity of the game and the integrity of the economic 
environment are maintained. However, we located one weakness in the web browser that came with the console 
that was open to spoofing attacks. A spoofing attack typically allows a user to take another user’s session and to 
control the processes within a session (Sendi, Dugennais, 2014). Such activity allows the theft of private identity 
information, the transfer of money between bank accounts, reputation damage and the use of the console as an 
attack vector against other eBusiness web based entities. These are serious concerns but responsibility for the 
vulnerability may not be directed at the console as such. The vast majority of our attempts at exploits were rejected 
or defeated by the security features of the console. The web browser in the console used for Internet connectivity, 
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game play and buying and selling was the identified weakness. Such a vulnerability can be treated by allowing 
regular upgrades and patches to the console. 
The paper is structured to review a relevant background literature and to establish security definitions for consoles 
and the related applications. The focus of the literature review is to be on spoofing attacks because this is where 
the vulnerability was found and it is the risk that requires treatment. It is noted that the literature in the area of 
Game Console security tends to be proprietary with only general security concerns being addressed in the academic 
literature, such as network security, device security and so on. The security penetration tests are then described 
and the results reported. The results show a vulnerability that may be treated to prevent exploitation and the 
implications for eBusiness attacks is discussed. The paper concludes with suggestions for hardening game consoles 
from such vulnerabilities and recommendations for further research. 
DEFINITIONS AND BACKGROUND LITERATURE 
The literature for Game Console security, exploits and patches largely appears in web based information forums. 
These forums include Wikis, News releases, developer postings, and proprietary promotions and so on. 
Consequently our literature selection reflects the current state of communications in the area. A review shows 
Game Console IS security is strong. Game Console systems are removable and the media located upon them can 
be changed in a multiplicity of ways. Consequently strong security resources are used to protect copyrights and 
digital rights.  Many games now feature downloadable content or can be entirely downloaded via the various 
marketplaces online. Hence, all of the current generation consoles use some form of unique identifier to prevent 
copying of code, and to prevent unauthorized programs from being run upon them (Beer, 2012).  The exact 
mechanism varies depending on the system in question. The Nintendo Wii utilizes a One Time Programmable 
memory chip, consisting of thirty-two four-byte words. The Xbox 360 uses a method of signing all attached 
memory media via the generation of Console Security Certificates. The PS3 system uses a series of keys that are 
generated based upon a single key, located within the ‘bootldr’ portion of the Cell architecture, known within the 
system as per_console_root_key_0.  This key is responsible for generation of sequentially numbered keys that are 
used at differing levels of the hardware and software. It is a direct descendant, key_1, being used for all subsequent 
key generations, while also being responsible for decrypting the unique id, or EID, of the system (Shrout, 2010). 
There are three types of session hijacks: active, passive, and hybrid (Dittrich, 1999).  In an active attack, the 
attacker replaces the victim in the line of communication between the victim and the target server/service.  This 
typically involves preventing attempts at communication from leaving the victim, often via the use of distributed 
denial of service attacks.  Passive is where the attacker allows communication between the victim and the service 
is allowed to continue, albeit monitored - this allows the attacker to gather information as it flows, essentially 
letting the victim do the work.  Hybrid is where the attacker shifts from passive to active midway through the 
process, and possibly back to hide their tracks. The five steps that make up a session hijack attack are: locating a 
target, finding an active session, performing sequence number prediction, taking one of the party’s offline, and 
then taking over the session fully and maintaining the connection (Vaughan, 2004). The tools used for this are 
packet sniffers – that are utilities or programs designed to analyze the flow of traffic through a network connection, 
be it wired or wireless.  This is mainly done to find a target of interest, one with high traffic to exploit and to hide 
the additional malicious packets going in and out.  The attacker sets up a direct connection between the attacker 
and either the target or the victim, by being on the same network. A wireless connection allows a roaming user to 
drop in and out, it also allows for a spoofer to sidle in and monitor the incoming/outgoing traffic for anything 
interesting (Reed, Taylor, Mackay, 2008). 
The art of preventing spoofing involves attacking the limitations of the spoof itself.  Key amongst these is the act 
of guessing the session sequence numbers. Unfortunately, the sequence numbers are generated via very simple 
algorithms, making guessing usually a simple process of monitoring and timing.  This appears to be due to the 
lack of cryptographic requirements for TCP/IP connections. A recent standard development provides both an 
updated discussion on this very topic, as well as a solution, in RFC 6528. It improves upon the former algorithms 
via the use of a MD5 hash.  However, this in turn suggests that sequence numbers can be avoided entirely, with 
the implementation of either IPsec as described under RFC 4301 or TCP-AO as per RFC 5925 (Ridgewell, 2011). 
The improvements are to replace the predictable sequence numbers with full cryptographic encapsulation of the 
data being sent, making traditional hijacking attempts far more difficult. Another option for prevention is the use 
of router stamping.  This technique was originally developed to fight against distributed/denial of service attacks, 
using spoofed IP addresses in a similar fashion to the spoofed addresses used when transmitting the faked packets 
in a session hijack attack.  It involves appending to the packets a fixed number of stamp slots, recording the routers 
and recording the ports used for the transmission. With deterministic stamping, this is done with the IP of every 
router encountered and produces large data (Xynos, Harries, Sutherland, Davies, Blyth, 2010).  The suggested 
algorithm appends a certain probability of recording as the packet is sent, with a limited number of slots to be 
filled - the result is a slightly larger packet, but one whose path could be traced. The technique has a weakness 
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with the possibility of one hijacker attempting a single assault, which means that they may be on the same ‘path’, 
router-wise, as the victim and hence have near identical router stamps. 
Detecting Spoofing is extremely difficult. Despite much research, there is little to help the defender prepare for an 
attack in advance. The hijacker hides by simply allowing traffic to flow as normal. But this does not mean that it 
is impossible. In wireless networks the detection of unauthorized stations and access points can be made. For 
session hijacking in particular, the methods available are via detecting sudden jumps or randomness in the 
sequence numbering of the packets, or checking that the MAC of the hardware is valid. Also the Received Signal 
Strength (or RSS), and the round trip times of the Request To Send/Clear To Send (RTS-CTS) handshake can be 
monitored for variations. This has the potential to foil attacks before they happen (Xbox Live, 2014). The approach 
targets the spoof itself - an expected duration for a given handshake (the process of the two ends of communication 
recognizing each other) is calculated.  As packets are sent, if they diverge from this predicted time and it is not a 
bad connection then it can be used as an indication that another source is then suddenly sending packets. Of note 
is that this method could be used similarly for smaller wired networks with few changes. 
TEST SET UP 
The test set up was kept simple and within a secure laboratory environment. The design consisted of an Xbox 360, 
a wireless router and an attacking PC (see figure 1). The action consisted of a game player using the console for 
play and services and an attacker who could monitor and catch the streaming packets going through the wireless 
network. In this way a wide range of attacks could be made on the console, the applications, and the actual games 
and on the communication streams. Session spoofing or hijacking could be achieved by catching a session ID and 
then assigning the ID to the attack vector. In some instances this worked well and in others it was picked up and 
defended against by the security provisions.  
The monitoring PC was set up running Ubuntu Linux with the infiltration software suite Aircrack-ng. It was 
responsible for the packet capture as the ‘victim’ console went about regular use. Airmon-ng comes with eighteen 
related programs, all involving the infiltration of wireless networks.  Of these, four were selected to infiltrate the 
wireless traffic and decrypt it into a format usable both by a potential attacker and in order to gather data on what 
traffic is coming from the game play.  The four programs used were: Airmon, responsible for setting up monitoring 
of a target wireless access point; Airodump, which captures the packets and places them into several common 
packet formats, most importantly the common .cap format; Aircrack, which handles the actual cracking of a 
wireless network to provide its access key; and finally Airdecap, which handles the decrypting of the captured .cap 
format files to make them usable and readable.  For the purposes of the test, the Aircrack program was provided 
with a word-list to be used in attempting to discover the access key. In this case, the word-list consisted solely of 
the access key, in order to speed up the process which may have otherwise taken many hours or even days. The 
resulting decrypted packet .cap file is still extremely hard to read using a common text editor.  Consequently 
Wireshark was used so that packets could be viewed and examined. Using Wireshark, the decrypted packets were 
inspected for use and analysed to discern how the console transmitted data between itself and the servers and how 
these packets were identified as genuine, particularly during the initial login of the ‘victim’ to the services. In 
addition Wireshark was used to forge fake packets within the secure testbed to attempt to trick the console into 
accepting a login from the ‘attacking’ PC and to accept other fake interventions. 
 
 
Figure 1. The Test Set Up 
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DATA ANALYSIS 
There are three stages of data processing; firstly, a casual read through the decrypted packet file to see if any 
identifying features or words of interest can be identified.  Following this, a keyword search was deployed, using 
Wireshark to attempt to filter packets containing information related to the act of logging into the Xbox Live 
service.  Typically, these keywords are some variation on ‘login’, ‘pass’, ‘user’, or ‘session’; even more common 
words such as ‘hello’ would be of interest, as they are used as part of the typical process of two systems identifying 
each other over a network.  Finally, there was an attempt to identify any patterns in the packets transmitted.  All 
of this will be of use when it comes time to identify the weaknesses of the Xbox services, and what data it may 
leave open to a potential monitoring attacker. Once the attack has been completed, and the data from it has been 
collected, attention will then turn to analyzing the collected data for evidence.   
The research environment presented a number of challenges that had to be resolved. HTTPS, SSL, and TLS secure 
protocols were the primary cause for change in the experiment’s design.  SSL and TLS are both examples of 
asymmetric cryptography where the client and server exchange public keys to set up a session and are used to 
protect the game system. In this particular case, analysis of the captured packets indicates that the services rely 
mostly upon the TLSv1 protocol (the initial version of the TLS protocol that was released, and in turn superseded 
by the TLSv1.1 and TLSv1.2 protocols). Consequently, the TLS encryption meant that the data being exchanged 
could not be analyzed.  It would have been possible to attempt TLS cracking or attempting to gain access to the 
consoles inbuilt private key but this ran beyond the scope of the research. The encryption issue affected spoofing 
attempts against the live processes and applications, which relied heavily on TLS for the exchange of non-vital 
data.  As a result, the attention went onto the console’s built-in implementation of Internet Explorer.  A simple 
monitoring of wireless traffic coming from the ‘victim’ (whose role was now relegated from game play to logging 
off and on) would be recorded and decrypted, with efforts focusing on unsecured/non-HTTPS traffic, in an attempt 
to obtain either a session ID or session cookie variable to be used by the monitoring PC, as per a more traditional 
PC-vs.-PC spoofing attempt. A change was also made to what portions of the captured packets were being 
inspected.  Where previously all the traffic was inspected under the new approach only those that were of 
unsecured HTTP data and featured cookie information were of interest.  This filtering process was made easy by 
the use of the Wireshark inbuilt packet filter that allows in this case, through the key phrase ‘http.cookie’. This 
automatically allows for http packets with cookie information contained within them to be identified, following 
which a manual search for words of interest (‘datr’, ‘session’, or some form of ID) can be done, or further 
refinement of the filtered list can be done by adding the term ‘contains’ followed by the words of interest. 
Under the initial attack, the ‘victim’ console was repeatedly logged in and out through powering the system on 
and off, manually logging in and out of the services, and forcing the service to disconnect via de-authentication 
attacks.  All three systems of attack produced similar packet numbers with the majority of these involving TLS 
encrypted communication.  Of note, however, are the times where the Xbox 360 initiates HTTP GETs for static 
images, typically for ads or to display box art on the screen. 
 
 
Figure 2. Traffic During Xbox Testing 
 
These HTTP GETs are, unlike the more secure HTTPS communication done with TLS, left unencrypted where 
all information is made plainly visible to both the receiver and sender.  Typically, this sort of unencrypted traffic 
is used for obtaining similarly low-security items of importance; in this case, image files.  While revealing the full 
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address of where the images are coming from, they do not offer up anything in the way of allowing for session 
spoof attacks, especially as they were transmitted without any cookie information. Under the revised attack, the 
console was tested at three levels - firstly under the case of using the general features such as game downloads or 
account updates, secondly with the available applications that are made available through the marketplace, and 
finally through the Internet Explorer application that is made freely available to users. It is a simple web browser 
with some display and navigation limitations. The testing showed that the Internet Explorer application was 
transmitting everything in unencrypted HTTP traffic - including, crucially, cookie information.  A particular packet 
was focused on soon after it was spotted, numbered 9626 in the decrypted packets. This particular packet was 
chosen for no specific reason, other than it appeared as part of the filtered Wireshark list of packets containing 
http.cookie information. The session ID was stored automatically within a cookie file.  By using ‘Edit This Cookie’ 
the session identifier was assigned to the key name “session” and was able to be edited to match the session 
identifier given by packet 9626. The Browser was then refreshed and the saved cookie with the spoofed ID tricked 
the target into believing that the attacking PC was using the same login as the game console via the Internet 
Explorer. Hence a controlled spoofing attack was completed. The implications of such an attack is that the Xbox 
360 can be compromised in the way described and used as an attack vector for any website accepting cookies and 
not defending the attack. The implications are for eBusiness sites that contain information of monetary and 
personal value that can be compromised by this attack. 
DISCUSSION 
Overall, the console services withstood the attacks quite well.  The use of TLSv1 to encrypt traffic and the use of 
ports that were unique to the services ensured that the communications are quite secure, at the least when it comes 
to session spoofing attacks. While none of the applications used were observed to allow insecure, non-HTTPS 
traffic to be transmitted with the exception of the Internet Explorer, this does point to a lack of uniformity in the 
way the console application data packets are transmitted. However, two items of related interest were revealed 
during the investigation. Firstly, the use of unsecured HTTP GETs to obtain static image files for display on the 
console.  While not exposing any information in and of themselves, they do show that the Xbox 360 has a potential 
for these packets to be intercepted and other images returned for display or other, more malicious objects returned 
such as steganographically encoded images or virally compromised files, and other malware.  At the very least, it 
would mean that disturbing images could be transferred for display through the GUI, albeit in a very roundabout 
way.  As the images appear to be cached for later display, however, this means that they could potentially be 
retrieved, allowing for the console to act as a go-between medium in transferring such images.  In the latter case, 
that of a viral attack, the console would either already need to have been infected in some way with the ‘base’ 
virus in order for the malicious code within it to run, or the image would have to make use of buffer overflow 
errors to allow the arbitrary code to be run. Also of note was how the services reacted to de-authentication attacks 
done during the process of collecting the four-way wireless handshake in the initial experiment. While not useful 
in terms of spoofing, this sort of attack would have ramifications in the realm of e-sports; that is, in order to force 
the opposing team offline at a critical moment in order to secure one’s own victory.  This could be used to 
essentially rig competitions that rely on a wireless medium for connecting multiple users. 
The Internet Explorer application however, shows that it is just as vulnerable as any other browser to the more 
simplistic session spoofing attacks. Beyond the spoofing results, however, the Internet Explorer application 
revealed one further item of interest; that of the meta-data containing the user-agent string.  The user-agent 
metadata is used to help figure out if any special tricks are needed to be used to render a particular web page.  
While largely redundant due to the standardization of web code and websites over the years, there are some unique 
problems that still crop up for different browsers based on how they were coded.  In this particular case, the user-
agent of the Internet Explorer application reads as follows: User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 9.0; 
Windows NT 6.1; Trident/5.0; Xbox).The key portion of interest here is how the browser identifies as Internet 
Explorer 9.0 - at the point of researching, the latest stable release of Internet Explorer was v11.0.9600.16438, two 
entire major releases later.  This means that the application has missed out on years of patches and security 
additions that the PC version of Internet Explorer has received; and essentially, this gives an attacker a readymade 
list of exploits that could be used simply by referring to all the security bulletins and patch notes released over the 
intervening editions. The session spoof that was used is different than the usual and more technical method of 
sequence number prediction. The use of the cookie/session variable to trick the receiving server can only be done 
due to HTTP traffic transmitting what are essentially human readable values. The risk is that such vulnerabilities 
can be exploited to introduce backdoors into a target system and while not directly related to session spoofing, it 
would allow for an attacker to potentially introduce more direct means of accessing the console. A further risk is 
that the console can be used (knowingly or unknowingly) as a vector to attack websites that allow spoofed cookies. 
The spoofing of cookies opens a range of potential IS and eBusiness attacks. In the first instance a player (and 
there are millions at any one time worldwide) could legitimately be playing an online game and they purchase an 
item online from within the game or they use the IS game console to purchase goods and/or services from any 
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eBusiness store. Similarly they may only be bidding on an auction or simply surfing sites for information. The 
vulnerability of unencrypted GET functions from the web browser then allows an attacker to hijack any session 
for transferring information or if the player has used credentials to access a secure site the attacker can access the 
secure site content (such as bank accounts, user accounts, member accounts and so on). These matters are of 
concern for IS security and can be addressed in a number of ways discussed in the background literature. The 
outstanding matters in our experiment were the age of the browser supplied with the game console and the lack of 
updates applied to patch the vulnerability. In the first instance the manufacturer could enforce policy to assure all 
elements of the console are standardized and that they accept only encrypted traffic. In the second instance policies 
to enforce regular patching of the browser could be implemented at either the hardware or the software layers.    
CONCLUSION 
The detection of session spoofing is usually obvious and most sites protect against it. The cookie-based method 
applied here essentially dodges detection and is not influenced by the usual sequence number checks as it does not 
matter to the receiving server what packets have been received when, only that the session identifier matches what 
it is expecting. The cookie-based spoofing can be prevented by strongly encrypted traffic or if every session was 
being fully monitored, then the differing sources of the packets would be quickly identifiable. The second option 
is resource intensive and would put a lot more pressure on the servers in question as they track and compare the 
sources, sequence numbers, and travel times of the packets being received. Consoles provide a unique opportunity 
for deploying monitoring and encryption based hardware to defend against spoofing. Every console is 
manufactured identically, barring the rare hardware revision across a console’s lifetime, applying hardware 
defenses could be applied straight to the console in the factory.  The two defenses that would best benefit from 
this would be router-stamping and faux-login techniques.  The former, router-stamping, could be ideal as the 
console’s manufacturers would control both ends of communication; client and server.  This would allow for end-
to-end packet and routing tracing.  Meanwhile, the faux-login approach could periodically attempt to send the fake 
login signals, possibly in reaction to suspicious activity in a console’s traffic, seeing if anyone then takes the bait 
on offer. The research results point to weaknesses in the console tested but all of the vulnerabilities can be removed 
by a better thought out security strategy by the vendors and better end-user security for the whole system. 
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